

## Geopolitics Turned Inwards: The Princeton Military Studies Group and the National Security Imagination\*

On a wet Wednesday morning in November 1940, an audience of academics, journalists, policymakers, business leaders, and military men crowded a Columbia University auditorium for a discussion on “The Bases for an American Defense Policy” at the Academy of Political Science’s annual meeting.<sup>1</sup> The first speaker, imperial and diplomatic historian Edward Mead Earle, opened on a contrarian note and questioned the session’s title. The term “defense” was “misleading,” Earle began. It designated a policy of “sitting back and waiting until the enemy is at one’s gates. Perhaps a better word to use is security.” For only with “security” could “the initiative . . . be ours, and only by taking the initiative, only by being prepared, if necessary, to wage war *offensively*, can we . . . make sure that defense is more than a phrase and is in fact a reality.” Earle’s co-panelists continued to use “defense,” but soon “national security” would be on the tip of all their tongues, as the United States pivoted from a policy of national defense to one of national security.<sup>2</sup> This was more than a semantic shift. National security heralded a novel way of imagining the world, one in which a permanently prepared United States would confront seemingly omnipresent threats. It marked the re-thinking and re-making of U.S. power abroad and at home.

References to “national security” in newspapers, policy discussions, and scholarship were sparse throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and, as evidenced by Earle’s panel, even the early 1940s. Of course, “security”—often without the modifier—and its counterpart “insecurity” were watchwords of the New Deal.

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1. “Experts to Weigh Defense Problems,” *New York Times*, November 3, 1940, 5.

2. Emphasis mine. Edward Mead Earle, “Political and Military Strategy for the United States,” lecture notes, Drafts/Transcripts-Lectures/Miscellaneous, box 37, Edward Mead Earle Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University (hereafter MLP). See Hanson Baldwin et al., “Discussion: The Bases of an American Defense Policy: Armed Forces,” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 19, no. 2 (1941): 49–57.

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But their meaning was bound to the economy. As the Depression wreaked its havoc, activists and policymakers sought to protect Americans' welfare through social security, old-age security, and even "a secure economy."<sup>3</sup> Yet in the domain of military and foreign policy, the term "national security" was sparingly used, compared to the much more common "national defense." U.S. presidents uttered the phrase "national security" only four times between 1918 and 1931, and these usages were, as Andrew Preston has written, more "rhetorical flourish" than attempts to posit a conceptual distinction.<sup>4</sup>

Yet by the end of the Second World War, the militarized understanding of national security—the version that Earle had advocated in 1940 and one that is much more familiar to us today—supplanted both the economic meaning of "security" and the use of "national defense."<sup>5</sup> And this sense of national security had become so ubiquitous that it was impossible, one commentator observed in 1945, to "leaf through a magazine" or even "go to a dinner party" without encountering talk of the "future security of the United States."<sup>6</sup> President Harry Truman's signing of the National Security Act of 1947 punctuated this growing cultural obsession by establishing the institutional infrastructure of the national security state.

The explosion of the concept in the mid-to-late 1940s has led several scholars to associate the origins of "national security" with the United States' World War II experience or the start of the Cold War.<sup>7</sup> But these works overlook the

3. Quotation from George Soule, "Security for Americans VII: Can We Provide Security?" *The New Republic*, January 16, 1935: 266–69. See also Abraham Epstein, *Insecurity: A Challenge to America* (New York, 1933); Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address to Advisory Council of the Committee on Economic Security, November 13, 1934, in Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project* (hereafter *APP*), accessed September 2, 2018, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14777>. For an assessment of the role of "security" in the New Deal, see Jennifer Klein, *For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public-Private Welfare State* (Princeton, NJ, 2006).

4. Andrew Preston, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 3 (2014): 486–88.

5. Exemplary works that link these two notions of security are Mark Neocleous, "From Social to National Security: The Fabrication of the Economic Order," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 3 (2006): 363–84; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA, 2005); Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time* (New York, 2014).

6. Joseph E. Johnson, "American Security and World Security," in *The United States in the Postwar World: Addresses Given at the 1945 Summer Conference of the University of Michigan*, eds., William Wilcox and Robert Hall (Ann Arbor, MI, 1947), 281–82. Cited in Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (New York, 1977), 195.

7. Works that locate national security's origins in the United States' wartime experience are Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge, UK, 1998); Julian Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York, 2009); Matthew Dallek, *Defenseless Under the Night: The Origins of Homeland Security* (New York, 2016); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA, 1992). Works that locate its origins in the early Cold War are Harold Koh, *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair* (New Haven,

concept's older lineages and do not explain *how* that concept became thinkable by the 1940s.<sup>8</sup> I argue that national security originated between the late interwar period and the United States' entry into the Second World War, in response to the world economic crisis, geopolitical instability, and rise of totalitarianism. Earle and his future colleagues in the Princeton Military Studies Group (hereafter referred to as the Princeton Group) had already elaborated and circulated a concept of national security—a more elastic and expansive alternative to national defense—over the course of the late 1930s and early 1940s. They were the first historical actors to theorize and explicitly promote the idea of national security, which meant, for them, a forceful foreign and military policy that identified threats before they materialized and that defended interests—both direct and indirect—far beyond the country's borders. David Ekbladh has highlighted the global dimensions of the Princeton Group's strategic vision and has argued that Earle and his colleagues represented an incipient globalism.<sup>9</sup> They and other globally minded Americans thought that, in order “to remain secure at home,” the United States “had to actively promote policies they believed would assure global stability.”<sup>10</sup> The world order was too vital, too volatile for the United States to retreat back to its borders. National security offered a blueprint.

Ekbladh has shown that the Princeton Group promoted a novel vision of the U.S. orientation to the world, but I argue this is only half of national security's story. National security also had a centripetal effect.<sup>11</sup> Earle and his colleagues projected their anxieties about the world order onto the United States itself, identifying a domestic price to be paid for the far-reaching geopolitical

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CT, 1990), esp. chaps. 2–3; Joseph Masco, *The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Durham, NC, 2014).

8. For works that extend national security's history further into the past, see Mark R. Schulman, “The Progressive Era Origins of the National Security Act,” *Dickinson Law Review* 104 (2000): 289–330; Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: the United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, WI, 2009); Alexandre Rios-Bordes, “Quand les Services de Renseignement Repensent la Guerre: Éléments d'une archéologie de la 'sécurité nationale' (États-Unis, 1919–1941),” *Politix* 104 (2013): 105–32.

9. For recent scholarship on U.S. globalism, see Jenifer Van Vleck, *Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendancy* (Cambridge, MA, 2013); Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950* (Princeton, NJ, 2017); Daniel Immerwahr, *How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States* (New York, 2019), chap. 13.

10. David Ekbladh, “Present at the Creation: Edward Mead Earle and the Depression-Era Origins of Security Studies,” *International Security* 36, no. 3 (2011/12): 107–41; David Ekbladh, “The Interwar Foundations of Security Studies: Edward Mead Earle, the Carnegie Corporation and the Depression-Era Origins of a Field,” *Global Society* 28, no. 1 (2014): 40–53. Quotation from description of Ekbladh's current book, accessed July 7, 2018, <http://ase.tufts.edu/history/faculty/ekbladh.asp>.

11. Some works that explore the domestic dimensions of national security are Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT, 1995); Jessica Wang, *American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999); Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, NJ, 2000).

commitments that national security demanded. U.S. institutions and citizens would have to be reimagined and remade—sometimes even along totalitarian lines.<sup>12</sup> The quest for national security, according to the Princeton Group, required universities to ally with the state and U.S. citizens to develop an awareness of the insecure world and embrace novel responsibilities. Linking these visions was a mission to put into practice what I call a national security imagination, a term that underscores that national security was, to use Earle's own words, as much "subjective" as it was "objective," as much in people's minds as it was tangibly in the world.<sup>13</sup>

The task of instilling the national security imagination in institutions and people ran up against a certain strand of U.S. exceptionalism. Between the end of the War of 1812 and the Second World War, the United States' oceanic frontiers, its weak neighbors to the north and south, and the British Navy's patrolling of the Atlantic Ocean provided the country with what C. Vann Woodward called "free security."<sup>14</sup> The condition of free security shaped how Americans conceived of national defense. It enabled President James Monroe and his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1823 to imagine the Western hemisphere free of European empires, without also imagining the deployment of U.S. forces to support that policy.<sup>15</sup> It also provided the United States the freedom to territorially expand without the risk of European retaliation.<sup>16</sup> Vital interests—interests that had to be defended—were limited to national borders and eventually to the rest of North America and certain overseas possessions, namely Hawai'i and the Panama Canal.<sup>17</sup> In the 1930s, this continentalist or

12. For discussion of the adoption of totalitarian models in the United States, see Kiran Klaus Patel, *Soldiers of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America* (Cambridge, UK, 2005), 278–79, 400–01; Kiran Klaus Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History* (Princeton, NJ, 2016), 65–90; Daniel Bessner, *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual* (Ithaca, NY, 2017), chap. 3.

13. Earle, "Traditional Aspects of American Security," notes from lecture at Columbia University, April 16, 1941, Lectures, Notes, Misc. Folder, box 32, Earle Papers, MLP. My language is inspired by Masco, *Theater of Operations*, as well as Deepa Kumar and Arun Kundnani, "Homeland and the Imagination of National Security," *Jacobin Magazine*, November 13, 2013, online, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/11/homeland-and-the-imagination-of-national-security/>, accessed May 15, 2019.

14. C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," *American Historical Review* 66, no. 1 (1960), 1–19. See Walter Lippmann's similar discussion of "unearned security" in *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston, MA, 1943), 47–77. See also Preston, "Monsters Everywhere," 481–84; Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 13–58.

15. Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 2011).

16. Extending the U.S. frontier did produce insecurity for settlers and especially for indigenous inhabitants. See Paul Frymer, *Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion* (Princeton, NJ, 2017).

17. John A. Thompson, "A Sense of Power: The Roots of America's Global Role" (Ithaca, NY, 2015): 47–50; Mark Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War," *Diplomatic History* 6, no. 3 (1982): 303–21; Fred

hemispheric vision of vital interests underlay attempts by Americans to keep the United States out of Asian and European wars. Whether it was the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s or the “isolationism” of the America First Committee, their proponents believed that the United States’ strategic location and the proactive defense of borders could keep “Fortress America” safe from danger.<sup>18</sup>

In the eyes of interventionists, however, that long century of “effective, reliable, and virtually free” security had cushioned Americans into believing that they were safe from war even after technological advances and global political changes ended the condition of free security.<sup>19</sup> What was needed to puncture this superstition was imagination—a peculiar, militarized imagination. Harold and Margaret Sprout, members of the Princeton Group, later indicated this sentiment after the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima when they suggested that “most Americans simply cannot imagine themselves huddling in underground shelters, fighting incendiary fires, picking in the charred ruins of their burned-out homes.” Instead of “forget[ting]” or playing the platitude “it can’t happen here,” the security of the United States depended on a widespread awareness of potential doom and gloom scenarios to enable expansive policies aimed at strengthening and safeguarding the United States.<sup>20</sup> The road to security was paved with feelings of insecurity.<sup>21</sup>

But the free security that the United States enjoyed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century did not mean that Americans always felt secure.<sup>22</sup> Nor did it mean that all Americans believed national defense should be restricted to just the continent or the Western hemisphere. Before the Princeton Group’s global conception of national security, many Americans had advocated for far-flung U.S. military commitments in attempts to ensure safety at home. Some foreign policy thinkers at the end of the nineteenth century expanded the notion of defense to include the protection of maritime trade routes and the need to attain colonies for raw resources.<sup>23</sup> Another innovation from a few decades later

Greene, “The Military View of National Policy, 1904–1940,” *American Historical Review* 66, no. 2 (1961): 354–77.

18. John A. Thompson, “Another Look at the Downfall of ‘Fortress America,’” *Journal of American Studies* 26, no. 3 (1992): 393–408; Christopher McKnight Nichols, “The Enduring Power of Isolationism: An Historical Perspective,” *Orbis* 57, no. 3 (2013): 396–401; Brooke L. Blower, “From Isolationism to Neutrality: A New Framework for Understanding American Political Culture,” *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 2 (2014): 345–76; Stephen Wertheim, “Tomorrow the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy in World War II” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2015), chap. 1.

19. Woodward, “The Age of Reinterpretation,” 6.

20. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, introduction to chapter on “Security in the United States: How Can We Achieve It?” in *Foundations of National Power; Readings on World Politics and American Security*, eds. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout (Princeton, NJ, 1945), 731.

21. John A. Thompson, “The Exaggeration of American Vulnerability: The Anatomy of a Tradition,” *Diplomatic History* 16, no. 1 (1992): 23–43.

22. H. Bruce Franklin, *War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination* (New York, 1988), chap. 2.

was the League of Nations' collective security mechanism, which sought to merge national defense responsibilities on an international scale.<sup>24</sup>

Just as there were earlier attempts to push the lines of defense beyond the continent and hemisphere, there were also actors during the 1930s and 1940s who formulated a global-interventionist policy. Social scientists, such as the co-founder of the Yale Institute of International Studies Nicholas Spykman, turned to the new science of "geopolitics" and promoted a territorial *Realpolitik* that linked U.S. safety to the balance of forces elsewhere.<sup>25</sup> Still others, like Harvard University professor of public administration Pendleton Herring and the future head of RAND's Social Science Division Hans Speier, pushed for a more aggressive military establishment infused with civilian expertise that had the muscle to counter states like Nazi Germany.<sup>26</sup> Most crucial, however, was President Roosevelt, whose growing worries from 1938 onwards about the danger of Germany and Japan led him to pursue a substantive role for the United States in the world crisis. In his first fireside chat specifically on "national security" in December 1940—one month after Earle addressed the crowd at Columbia—Roosevelt linked the Depression's economic insecurity with the geopolitical insecurity spurred by World War II, announced the need for domestic mobilization, and reiterated his support for Great Britain.<sup>27</sup>

With the exception of Roosevelt, however, few people beyond the Princeton Group consistently employed the language of national security in this period.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Earle and his colleagues were exceptional in combining into a single concept both an embrace of power politics and the desire for domestic transformation. Members of the Princeton Group completed much of the early discursive legwork. After articulating the first definition of national security, they pushed the term into the political mainstream through their connections to East Coast movers and shakers, many of whom would later be the most vociferous proponents of national security, such as wartime Secretary of the Navy and

23. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston, MA, 1890), introductory.

24. Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago, IL, 1999), chaps. 2–3.

25. Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York, 1942). See Peter Francis Coogan, "Geopolitics and the Intellectual Origins of Containment" (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1991), 47–81; Paulo Jorge Batista Ramos, "The Role of the Yale Institute of International Studies in the Construction of the United States National Security Ideology, 1935–1951" (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 2003); Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 10–15.

26. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy Under Arms* (New York, 1941); Hans Speier and Alfred Kähler, eds., *War in Our Time* (New York, 1939). For Herring's work and influence, see Douglas T. Stuart, *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Changed America* (Princeton, NJ, 2012), 9–11, 27–31. For Speier's work and influence, see Bessner, *Democracy in Exile*.

27. Franklin Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, December 29, 1940, *APP*, accessed September 1, 2018, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15917>. See Preston, "Monsters Everywhere," 496–98.

28. Ekbladh, "Present at the Creation," 116–17.

future Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and the widely syndicated columnist—"the conscience of the nation"—Walter Lippmann.<sup>29</sup>

The Princeton Group's national security imagination smashed the border separating domestic from foreign, soldier from civilian, and even war from peace.<sup>30</sup> But the collapse of these distinctions was not merely ideational. In the post-World War II era, the United States scoured the homeland for fifth columns, bombarded civilian infrastructures in the Korean peninsula and later across Southeast Asia, and set the country on a permanent war footing that persists to this day.

#### RE-IMAGINING STRATEGY

Witness to the world crisis and a student of international affairs, Earle was caught up in the historically perilous moment of the interwar era. That moment would leave its mark on Earle and his colleagues' understanding of the United States' proper role in the world. Earle received his BA in history from Columbia University in 1917 and served as a lieutenant in both the Field Artillery and Air Service in World War I before earning a PhD in history from Columbia in 1923. He published widely on diplomatic history and international relations, quickly rose to academic fame, and received tenure from his alma mater in 1927. Earle also embraced the policy-oriented circuit. From 1924 to 1927, he served on the board of the Foreign Policy Association and lectured at the Army War College and Army Industrial College.<sup>31</sup> His Stakhanovite productivity gave out, however, after he contracted tuberculosis in 1928, leaving him incapacitated for half a decade. Earle re-booted his career in 1933 and attained a faculty position at the Institute for Advanced Study's School of Economics and Politics, a novel multidisciplinary research institution that maintained a small permanent faculty and a continuously changing cast of scholars in residence—a "paradise of scholars," according to the Institute's founder and director, Abraham Flexner.<sup>32</sup>

Earle's scholarship and political life in the 1920s reflected a cautious anti-imperialism. In *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in*

29. Quotation from Alden Whitman, "Walter Lippmann, Political Analyst, Dead at 85," *New York Times*, December 15, 1974, 1. See Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of Times James Forrestal* (New York, 1992); Jeffrey Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949* (College Station, TX, 1991); David Milne, *Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy* (New York, 2015), chap. 4.

30. A similar analysis can be found in Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 12-13.

31. Robert Vitalis, Article Review of "Present at the Creation: Edward Mead Earle and the Depression-Era Origins of Security Studies" by David Ekbladh, *H-Diplo ISSF*, No. 14 (2012), available at <http://issforum.org/articlereviews/14-present-creation-earle>, 3. For a survey of the Foreign Policy Association, see Alan Raucher, "The First Foreign Affairs Think Tanks," *American Quarterly* 30, no. 4 (1978): 493-513. Earle Bio, Earle Faculty File (1950-1970), box 7, Records of the Director of the Office, Shelby White and Leon Levy Archives Center at the Institute for Advanced Study (hereafter IASA).

32. Abraham Flexner, "A Proposal to Establish an American University," November 1922. Quoted in Thomas Neville Bonner, *Iconoclast: Abraham Flexner and a Life of Learning* (Baltimore, MD, 2002), 238.

*Imperialism* [sic], which netted him the inaugural George Louis Beer Prize from the American Historical Association, Earle excoriated the role of imperial interests as the root of international conflicts.<sup>33</sup> Like many other thinkers of his time, including his friend and mentor Charles Beard, Earle's anti-imperialism gave way to a more general skepticism of the United States' projection and protection of its self-interest abroad, as he feared that foreign involvement would plunge the country into a competition with other empires.<sup>34</sup> But the increasingly volatile international order shook this commitment. Like other "nervous liberals" in the 1930s, Earle came to champion aggressive policies abroad and democratic sacrifices at home.<sup>35</sup>

Earle's first full-throated statement on the changes wrought to the world system and their normative implications for U.S. policy appears in a 1937 proposal to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, one of the major foundations funding social scientific research and education since the 1910s.<sup>36</sup> Seeking funds for a research seminar devoted to better understanding military affairs and foreign policy, Earle was motivated by a sense that modernity blurred the boundary between war and peace. Whereas the architects of the Kellogg-Briand Pact a decade prior had identified "war as an instrument of national policy," Earle now wondered if it was the other way around. Even though most of the world was in a state of "so-called peace," he claimed, "military policy dominates statecraft." In Japan, Italy, and Germany, government restrictions on "the press, the radio, the church, [and] the school" were now "understandable by reference to the obvious fact that under modern conditions almost all phases of life must be subordinated to the exigencies of war." And those measures were spreading elsewhere. These developments existentially threatened democracies, whose survival, he wrote, might require "fundamental compromises between political freedom and military necessity." Earle hoped his seminar might help steer national policy in the direction of survival.<sup>37</sup>

33. Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism* (New York, 1924); Vitalis, Review of "Present at the Creation," 2.

34. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*, 348–50; Edward Mead Earle, "The Outlook for American Imperialism," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 108 (1923): 104–07; Charles Beard and William Beard, *The American Leviathan: The Republic in the Machine Age* (New York, 1930).

35. Phrasing coined by World War II propagandist Archibald MacLeish. See Brett Gary, *The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War* (New York, 1999), 6–7, 133–73. For discussion of the related concept of "democratic realism," see Bessner, *Democracy in Exile*, 76–79.

36. For assessments of the role of foundations in the history of the social sciences, see Donald Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science Research Council* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1993); Nicolas Guilhot, ed., *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011).

37. Earle, "Military Policy and Statecraft: A Proposed Field for Study in International Relations," n.d. [November 1937], Earle Faculty File (1936–37), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA.

The Carnegie Corporation rejected that original proposal. (One of the Carnegie administrators referred to it as “propaganda” and therefore not a project fit for the foundation’s mandate.)<sup>38</sup> Earle, using the Institute for Advanced Studies’ own funds instead, launched the seminar in the fall of 1939.<sup>39</sup> Shortly thereafter, though, as Europe collapsed into general war, the Carnegie Corporation came to share the urgency of Earle’s project and commenced a “National Emergency Program” to support work related to “national defense.” The foundation began to dole out money for the seminar in February 1940 and would continue to support Earle’s activities until his early death in 1954.<sup>40</sup>

Earle attracted a steady stream of U.S. and émigré social scientists into the Institute to fill the ranks of the seminar. The first cohort consisted of luminaries such as the historian Robert Albion and Margaret and Harold Sprout, a married couple respected for their expertise in naval strategy, along with the diplomatic historian Albert K. Weinberg, political theorist Felix Gilbert (Germany), geographer Jean Gottmann (France), and Charles Beard’s son-in-law Alfred Vagts (Germany).<sup>41</sup> The seminar served as a professional stepping-stone for international relations scholars and strategists Bernard Brodie, Stefan Possony (Austria), Richard Stebbins, and William T. R. Fox, while offering mid-career platforms for others, namely the war economist Albert Lauterbach (Austria) and the president of the American Military Institute, Harvey DeWeerd.<sup>42</sup> Given this roster, one scholar has claimed, hyperbolically, that every social scientist studying strategy in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s participated in the Princeton Group’s seminar.<sup>43</sup>

That so many scholars from such a variety of countries and disciplines participated in a seminar focused on strategy and statecraft was made possible by the rapid institutional build-up of international relations—a field that merged many social sciences around one object of analysis, the world—in the previous

38. Report on Grant, Studies of Military and Foreign Policies, June 23, 1942, IAS Study of Military and Foreign Policies of U.S. (1942–54) File, box 178, Carnegie Corporation of New York Records, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, New York (hereafter CCNY Records, CRBML).

39. “Memorandum for Mr. Keppel,” December 29, 1938, IAS Study of Military and Foreign Policies of U.S. (1937–41) File, box 178, Carnegie Corporation Grant Files, CCNY Records, CRBML; Report on Grant, Studies of Military and Foreign Policies, June 23, 1942, IAS Study of Military and Foreign Policies of U.S. (1942–54) File, box 178, CCNY Records, CRBML.

40. National Emergency Program, February 10, 1941, IAS Study of Military and Foreign Policies of U.S. (1937–41) File, box 178, CCNY Records, CRBML. The first grant was \$6,500, or about \$115,000 in 2018. Cross reference sheet, December 16, 1939, IAS Study of Military and Foreign Policies of U.S. (1937–41) File, box 178, CCNY Records, CRBML.

41. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918* (Princeton, NJ, 1939); Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922* (Princeton, NJ, 1943).

42. “Studies of the Foreign Relations and Military Policies of the United States, at the Institute for Advanced Study,” appendix, 1942, Earle Faculty File (1940–1944), box 6, Records of the Office of the Director, IASA.

43. Barry Steiner, *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy* (Lawrence, KS, 1991), 2. Cited in Ekbladh, “Present at the Creation,” 126.

two decades. The interwar period saw the establishment of the first U.S. international relations programs, specialized journals, think tanks, and associations, many of which were supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, and the Carnegie Corporation.<sup>44</sup> The Council on Foreign Relations and its journal *Foreign Affairs*, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins, and the Yale Institute of International Studies all debuted between 1921 and 1935.<sup>45</sup> U.S. foundations also supported similar institutional developments in Europe, such as the Hamburg *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* (Institute for Foreign Policy)—where a young Alfred Vagts had worked—and the Academy of International Law at the Hague, both of which were founded in 1923.<sup>46</sup> The aim of these scholars on both sides of the Atlantic and their bankrollers was not merely to interpret the world, but to change it.

Emerging from this interwar context, the Princeton Group scholars met weekly to discuss and “clarify[.]” according to Harvey DeWeerd, problems related to “American security” and “grand strategy.”<sup>47</sup> In addition to their weekly meeting, their academic output ranged from hosting conferences to collaborating on book projects, including their popular *Makers of Modern Strategy*, a sketch of the canon of military strategy.<sup>48</sup> Like their colleagues elsewhere, the Princeton Group scholars’ goal was to weaponize knowledge in order to influence policy-making and public opinion. To this end, they often invited elites from government, military, and the pundit class to participate in the seminar. Earle also urged his colleagues to write, not academic monographs, but “short memoranda” that “might be placed in the hands of persons who actually influence the course of events in Washington.”<sup>49</sup> One of those recipients, Walter Lippmann, followed the Princeton Group’s work closely and once wistfully wrote to Earle that he would “rather be working in that seminar than anything else.”<sup>50</sup>

44. Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York, 2012), 31–96.

45. Ramos, “The Role of the Yale Institute of International Studies in the Construction of the United States National Security Ideology”; Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of International Relations* (Ithaca, NY, 2015), 59–84; Robert D. Schulzinger, *Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York, 1984), chaps. 1–3.

46. Katharina Rietzler, “Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of Philanthropic Internationalism in the Interwar Years,” in *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars*, ed. Daniel Laqua (London, 2011), 45–65.

47. Harvey DeWeerd, “Princeton: A Center of Military Studies,” *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, June 5, 1942, 7–8.

48. Edward Mead Earle, Gordon Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, NJ, 1943). See also Michael Finch, “Edward Mead Earle and the Unfinished *Makers of Modern Strategy*,” *Journal of Military History* 80, no. 3 (2016): 781–814.

49. Earle, “Supplementary Statement on American Foreign Policy,” Earle Faculty File (1938), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA.

50. Walter Lippmann to Earle, November 6, 1941, box 8, folder 351, Walter Lippmann Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Led by Earle, the Princeton Group formulated a critique of national defense.<sup>51</sup> The European crisis appeared to be proving that defensive policies were insufficient for the dangers of the modern world. Defensive foreign policies had permitted the rise of totalitarian states and, on the battlefield, static defensive postures like the Maginot Line were no match for the mobility of the Nazi *Blitzkrieg*.<sup>52</sup> Earle instead proposed “national security” as an alternative. But, though national security seemed to imply more active measures, its meaning remained imprecise. The Princeton Group set its sight on a definition.

Albert Weinberg began to define national security in a memorandum for his colleagues in the autumn of 1940. He described national security as a “condition” in which “external attack . . . upon the nation’s territorial domain, rights or vital interests is not likely to be made or, if made, to succeed.”<sup>53</sup> Responding to the memo, members of the Princeton Group critiqued the definition. Felix Gilbert highlighted an epistemological problem: each country or era had differing criteria for “rights” and “vital interests.” Others, such as Albert Lauterbach, saw security in terms of scarcity: one country’s measures to secure itself would directly infringe upon another’s national security concerns. Broadening it even further, Earle defined national security in psychological terms: “If the belief in security does not exist,” he wrote, “even the substance of security may easily be destroyed.” Finally, capturing the irony of their disagreements, Richard Stebbins warned that the “progress” of the Princeton Group’s forthcoming edited volume on national security’s changing conditions “threaten[ed] to be impeded by this effort to define a concept which is already sufficiently familiar to each of us.”<sup>54</sup>

Although Earle weaved Weinberg’s memorandum and the rest of the Princeton Group’s suggestions into a page-long definition of national security, that book was never completed.<sup>55</sup> Their disagreements extended beyond an abandoned publication and pointed to a central tension underlying their idea of national security. The same qualities that made national security superior to the term national defense—its elasticity and expansiveness, its focus on pre-emption and preparedness—rendered the concept near-impossible to define. *Defending* the nation seemed to be more intuitive than *securing* it.

From the Princeton Group’s unwieldy understanding of national security came a re-appraisal of the United States’ commitments abroad and capabilities

51. Earle, “American Military Policy and National Security,” *Political Science Quarterly* 53, no. 1 (1938): 1–13.

52. Earle, “American Security—Its Changing Conditions,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 218 (1941): 186–93.

53. Albert Weinberg, “The Meaning of National Security in General and in American History,” n.d. [autumn 1940], Security folder, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP.

54. Emphasis in original. “Comments on Mr. Weinberg’s definition of National Security,” memorandum, n.d. [autumn 1940], Security folder, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP.

55. Earle, “Further Comments,” Security folder, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP.

at home.<sup>56</sup> Harold Sprout proclaimed that the boundaries enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine had to be pushed further outward. “We must prevent any and all rivals,” Sprout wrote, “from gaining footholds anywhere within striking, or even within threatening distance by air as well as by sea.”<sup>57</sup> This geographic area, however, did not “represent the totality of our military defense problem.” There were also overseas territories, the maintenance of globalized trade networks, and, most ambitious of all, “the world order” that required U.S. protection. But then Sprout turned the idea of national security inward. The “frontiers of defense,” he argued, were “industrial,” as economic production was both a source of national security and a potential target of sabotage. And they were “psychological.” National security entailed both securing Americans and making them *feel* secure.<sup>58</sup> U.S. institutions and citizens had to internalize the epic dimensions of the United States’ strategy that Sprout laid out. It was a way of imagining the world and imagining one’s place in it. The Princeton Group believed that social scientists, universities, and ordinary citizens had to re-imagine and remake themselves. The quest for national security depended on it.

#### RE-IMAGINING UNIVERSITIES

The Princeton Group envisioned universities as critical nodes in the present crisis and a future national security state. Modern war, after all, placed a high premium on specialized knowledge and technical skill, both of which universities could provide. Moreover, as the pursuit of national security over national defense required a shift in values, universities would have to disseminate novel understandings of war and peace. The institutionalization of military studies, in particular, would aid these efforts. By studying war, undergraduates—the next generation of elites—would develop an awareness and appreciation of military matters. While contemporary thinkers such as political scientist Harold Lasswell *described* the transformation of expert knowledge and war, the Princeton Group was notable in how it *prescribed* those relations.<sup>59</sup> When U.S. mobilization began, the Princeton Group eagerly brought the war to campuses and hoped to sustain academic-military collaboration through the postwar years.<sup>60</sup>

56. The United States was not the only nation to globalize its military and foreign policy in this period. See Jean-Christophe Sauvage, “L’institut des hautes études de défense nationale: une vision globale de la politique de défense de la France” (Ph.D. diss., Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, 1998).

57. Harold Sprout, “Frontiers of Defense.” *Military Affairs* 5, no. 4 (1941): 217–21.

58. *Ibid.*, 219–20.

59. Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–68. An earlier critic of these developments was Randolph Bourne. See his “The State” [1918], reprinted in *War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915–1919*, ed. Carl Resek (New York, 1964), 65–104.

60. The Princeton Group’s vision for the university prefigured the “Cold War University” that would arrive in the postwar period. See Stuart W. Leslie, *The Cold War and American*

Earle first decried “the absence of general scholarly interest” in military studies all the way back in his 1937 proposal to the Carnegie Corporation.<sup>61</sup> But it was Alfred Vagts who most vociferously outlined the Princeton Group’s re-imagining of the university. Vagts argued that the defeat of Nazism required borrowing from the Nazis’ use of universities. The Princeton Group’s ambivalence towards totalitarianism—as an object of both fear and emulation—reflected a broader U.S. debate over whether democracies were even capable of combatting totalitarian states.<sup>62</sup> In his 1940 article, “War and the Colleges,” Vagts brought attention to the role that universities played in Germany’s “*Wehrwirtschaft*” (military economy), that is, a statist economy oriented towards military preparedness, which now threatened democracies around the world. The Nazi government recognized early on the novel combination of technology and specialized knowledge needed for total war, and so, according to Vagts, it adapted universities accordingly. It introduced an invigorated military studies program and even schooled its officers in the science of *Wehrwirtschaft*.<sup>63</sup> Though the Nazi relationship with academe and intellectuals was more fraught than Vagts let on, the study of military matters did grow in importance under the Nazis. In 1938, the rector of the University of Heidelberg declared his institution to be “a place of military-political education.”<sup>64</sup> The results of these totalitarian efforts struck fear in Vagts. They also appeared to him as a model for the United States.

Compared to the totalitarian university, Vagts claimed that U.S. universities were ill-equipped to confront the world crisis.<sup>65</sup> Their objective of transmitting canonical knowledge across generations tended toward conservatism at the expense of addressing contemporary problems. Too absorbed by “scholastic hobbies, the overspecialized dissertation, the playful or ponderous antiquarian research, the belief in the services of diplomacy and the functioning of traditional international law,” U.S. academics failed to examine questions related to war and power. And because “the American intelligentsia did not grasp the spread of insecurity in the world ... it played practically no part in the

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*Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford* (New York, 1993); Rebecca S. Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford* (Berkeley, CA, 1997).

61. Edward Mead Earle, “National Defense and Political Science,” *Political Science Quarterly* 55, no. 4 (1940): 481–95, quotation on 485; Earle, “American Military Policy and National Security.”

62. Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York, 1995), 31–71; Michaela Hoenicke Moore, *Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933–1945* (Cambridge, UK, 2010); Udi Greenberg, *The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ, 2014), chap. 4; Bessner, *Democracy in Exile*, 1–3, 73–101.

63. Alfred Vagts, “War and the Colleges,” *American Military Institute*, doc. 4, 1940, 1, 7–8, copy in IAS Study of Military and Foreign Policies of U.S. (1937–41) File, box 178, CCNY Records, CRBML.

64. Quoted in Steven P. Remy, *The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 61–62.

65. Vagts, “War and the Colleges,” 3.

preparation or discussion of the steps that were finally found necessary to avert military danger to this hemisphere.”<sup>66</sup>

Although war-related scholarship in the interwar era was marginal compared to its output during and after the Second World War, scholarly interest was not unknown prior to the Princeton Group. The political scientist Quincy Wright had labored over his encyclopedic *A Study of War* since the 1920s, and officers at the Army War College founded the American Military History Foundation and its *Journal of the American Military History Foundation* in the 1930s.<sup>67</sup> In the context of a global war, however, its study became much more popular and urgent. Reflecting this shift, in 1941, the American Military History Foundation gave its journal a new and broader name, *Military Affairs*.<sup>68</sup> Vagts accused his academic predecessors of jeopardizing the country for not making these changes sooner.

Vagts linked the university’s conservatism to the problem of the traditional military ideal that still framed many Americans’ thinking on war and peace. Earlier modes of warfare, based on a civilian militia or national guard, had crystallized into a widespread ideal among Americans. But the Germans demonstrated that modern total wars were won and national security maintained through a knowledge elite—“highly expert war-technicians”—capable of organizing war industry, integrating armed forces on the battlefield, and translating social science into strategy.<sup>69</sup> Total war meant Midwestern farmers could not defeat professionally trained soldiers.<sup>70</sup>

Vagts concluded that the solution to supplanting both the university’s conservatism and the outdated ideal of the military lay in modernizing the university. He advocated for nothing less than converting “ivory towers into watchtowers.” Only then would the university attain its proper social authority. If charged with “the task of getting the nation out of its own past [and] into the fearful present,” the university could produce knowledge and technologies necessary for war-making and indoctrinate students into the national security imagination.<sup>71</sup> The dual function of the university—production of knowledge and of values—would thus be attuned to contemporary circumstances. To pursue their vision of the university, members of the Princeton Group worked collectively towards establishing what Earle called a “*centre d’études militaires*”—presumably invoking the name of the recently founded military strategy academy for French

66. Alfred Vagts, “Ivory Towers into Watchtowers,” *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 17, no. 2 (1941): 161–78, quotations on 164, 169–70.

67. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago, 1942); Daniel Gorman, “International Law and the International Thought of Quincy Wright, 1918–1945,” *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 2 (2017): 336–61; Emily Hill Griggs, “A Realist before ‘Realism’: Quincy Wright and the Study of International Politics Between Two World Wars,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24, no. 1 (2001): 75; “Foreword,” *The Journal of the American Military History Foundation* 1, no. 1 (1937).

68. “Back Matter,” *Military Affairs* 5, no. 1 (1941).

69. Vagts, “Ivory Towers into Watchtowers,” 167–69, 174–75.

70. *Ibid.*, 167–68.

71. *Ibid.*, 178.

officers—in the Princeton community and bringing national security concerns to campuses across the country.<sup>72</sup>

The Princeton Group established and promoted undergraduate and graduate courses devoted to military studies across the country. In 1939, Harold Sprout taught courses at Princeton on the “Quest for National Security” and “Political and Military Geography,” while his colleague Robert Albion taught “Military History and American Defense Problems.”<sup>73</sup> And then, in 1940 and 1941, seminar members assisted several universities in preparing courses on military affairs.<sup>74</sup> To facilitate the spread of military studies even further, the Princeton Group published a syllabus titled *War and National Policy*.<sup>75</sup>

The Princeton Group’s interest in bringing military studies to academe also helped propel many of its members into the war itself. Government and military officials began to recognize members of the Princeton Group as potential experts for U.S. mobilization and eventually hired several of them. They joined the hordes of social scientists who contributed their expertise to the war effort.<sup>76</sup> Alfred Vagts and Jean Gottmann worked for the Board of Economic Warfare; Stefan Possony produced radio propaganda in Central Europe for the Columbia Broadcasting System; and Felix Gilbert worked as a research analyst for both the State Department and Office of Strategic Services.<sup>77</sup> Brodie, whose *Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy* became required reading for the Reserve Officers’ Training Corp, ended up working for the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the State Department.<sup>78</sup> Earle, meanwhile, served in the Office of Strategic Services and headed the Committee of Operations Analysts of the Army Air Force—the group that determined the strategy of the Allied aerial bombing campaign against Germany and Japan—in the last two years of the war.<sup>79</sup> By 1942, their war work had become so extensive that Earle halted the

72. Edward Mead Earle, “The Princeton Program of Military Studies” *Military Affairs* 6, no. 1 (1942), 23. See Sauvage, “L’institut des hautes études de défense nationale.”

73. *Daily Princetonian*, February 25, 1938, 4; Harvey DeWeerd, “Princeton: A Center of Military Studies” *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, June 5, 1942, 8.

74. Earle to Mr. Kepler, June 2, 1941, Edward M. Earle Folder (1937–1951), box 135, CCNY Records, CRBML.

75. Earle to seminar members, September 17, 1941, Seminar on American Military Policy, box 5, Earle Papers, MLP.

76. Barry M. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); Wertheim, “Tomorrow, the World,” 65–82.

77. Hayes A. Kroner to Earle, Earle Faculty File (1940–44), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA; Earle to Frank Aydelotte, June 5, 1942, Earle Faculty File (1940–44), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA; Felix Gilbert, *A European Past: Memoirs, 1905–1945* (New York, 1988), 177–220.

78. Bernard Brodie, *A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton, NJ, 1942). Earle, “Memorandum for Dr. Aydelotte,” April 7, 1943, IAS Study of Military and Foreign Policies of U.S. (1937–41) File, box 178, CCNY Records, CRBML.

79. Earle to Members of the Seminar, September 17, 1941, Seminar on American Military Policy Folder, box 5, Earle Papers, MLP; Earle Bio, Earle Faculty File (1950–1970), box 7, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA.

seminar, though they continued to correspond and collaborate throughout and after the war.

In addition to their individual contributions to the war effort, Earle attempted to lure mobilization to Princeton and other campus towns. Writing in May 1942 to Vice-Admiral of the Navy Theodore S. Wilkinson, professor of economics and history at the U.S. Military Academy Herman Beukema, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Earle invited the government and armed services to take advantage of the facilities offered by universities in general and Princeton University in particular.<sup>80</sup> The “academic world,” Earle wrote, was interested in expanding its contribution to the “successful prosecution of the war.” And as modern war was “a many-sided and complicated business which requires a great variety of skills and the utilization of all available scientific and specialized knowledge,” the Armed Forces and other agencies should look to employing the “experienced personnel” of universities and taking advantage of “physical equipment” such as “laboratories, residence halls, libraries, map collections and class rooms.”<sup>81</sup> Earle framed the invitation in terms of benefit to the armed services and government *and* universities, as the increasing presence of the military on campuses would be a boon for their long-term development.

Earle was particularly interested in the military coming to the town of Princeton, boasting about its assemblage of “special fields of knowledge, unusually qualified specialists, and excellent physical facilities,” all of which could aid the war effort. Between Princeton University, the IAS, and several local firms, the community possessed expertise in the sciences, public opinion, military intelligence, and, thanks to his seminar, strategy and security. The continuous flow of academics to Washington and other centers for government and military service threatened the concentration of intellectual and material resources in Princeton. Earle hoped to turn this trend around. Princeton’s proximity to New York, Philadelphia, and Washington rendered it an ideal alternative center for training reserves or conducting military research.<sup>82</sup> Henry Stimson expressed gratitude and informed Earle that the “very patriotic offer” would be circulated among the agencies tasked with training personnel.<sup>83</sup>

As the war progressed, Princeton did become a critical center for the war effort. Several Princeton Group members organized the army orientation

80. Earle to Admiral T.S. Wilkinson, May 16, 1942, Earle Faculty File (1940-44), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA. See also: Earle to Henry Stimson, May 14, 1942, Princeton Facilities and Army Schools – 1942 Folder, box 24, Earle Papers, MLP; Herman Beukema to Earle, May 5, 1942, Princeton Facilities and Army Schools-1942 Folder, box 24, Earle Papers, MLP.

81. Earle to Admiral T.S. Wilkinson, May 16, 1942, Earle Faculty File (1940-44), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA.

82. Earle to Admiral T.S. Wilkinson, May 16, 1942, Earle Faculty File (1940-44), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA.

83. Henry Stimson to Earle, June 8, 1942, Princeton Facilities and Army Schools 1942 Folder, box 24, Earle Papers, MLP.

curriculum for new recruits.<sup>84</sup> Harvey DeWeerd transported the headquarters of the American Military Institute and the journal *Military Affairs* to Princeton in 1942.<sup>85</sup> And, in early 1944, Forrestal, now Secretary of the Navy, commissioned Harold and Margaret Sprout to develop a “pilot course” for naval reserves in the wartime V-12 Program.<sup>86</sup> With the goal of providing future officers knowledge of “world affairs,” the Sprouts produced a syllabus and tested it on the Princeton Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. Professors at elite universities across the country followed suit and administered the Sprouts’ experimental naval training program.<sup>87</sup> Forrestal advertised the course as an example of potential military-academy collaboration to “makers of opinion,” such as Lippmann.<sup>88</sup> The course grew into a “regular feature” of the postwar naval training curriculum, and the Sprouts would publish the syllabus’ readings as a textbook titled *Foundations of National Power: Readings on World Politics and American Security*.<sup>89</sup> Through this program and publication, the Princeton Group’s expansive notion of national security circulated among military officers and trainees.

The growing presence of military officers and administrators in Princeton led to increased interest throughout town. To be sure, Princeton’s involvement in the war was the result of historical forces more powerful than just the Princeton Group’s influence, such as the federally directed mobilization effort and a national sense of duty at the grassroots level.<sup>90</sup> Professors and administrators unconnected to the Princeton Group lined up to contribute to the war effort. In 1943, an architecture professor named Jean Labatut trained students in “camouflage discipline” by converting the Princeton stadium into a laboratory for “camouflage experiments.”<sup>91</sup> But no group did as much to bring the war to campus as did the Princeton Group. Moreover, Earle and his colleagues spotted an opportunity in the crisis to build up a longer-term academic-military arrangement that would persist in times of war as well as in “times of peace.”<sup>92</sup> Princeton quickly became the academic-military admixture that Vagts and Earle had only fantasized about before the United States entered the war.

84. Herman Beukema to Earle, December 10, 1941, Army Camp Lectures Folder, box 24, Earle Papers, MLP.

85. DeWeerd, “Princeton: A Center of Military Studies,” 8; Robert Albion, “The Institute’s Opportunities in Wartime” *Military Affairs* 6, no. 2 (1942): 130–32.

86. Harold Sprout, Memorandum concerning Sprout’s war service, March 30, 1945, Correspondence S, box 22, Earle Papers, MLP.

87. Sprout and Sprout, eds., *Foundations of National Power*, viii.

88. James Forrestal to Harold Sprout, September 17, 1944, folder 49, box 29, James Forrestal Papers, MLP; James Forrestal to Earle, September 24, 1944, folder 20, box 15, James Forrestal Papers, MLP.

89. Sprout and Sprout, eds., *Foundations of National Power*, viii.

90. Richard Challener, “Response to War,” *Princeton History* 11 (1992): 48–65.

91. “Stepladder,” *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, October 15, 1943, 3–4.

92. Earle, “National Defense and Political Science,” 490–91.

## RE-IMAGINING CITIZENS

The Princeton Group's concern for national security drove its members to also re-imagine citizens. National security, they argued, hinged upon a productive, confident citizenry capable of combat. Moreover, strategic thinking was no longer the exclusive task of military officers and diplomats. Ordinary Americans had to understand the international order, recognize threats to their country, and support the extensive parameters—domestic and global—of securing the United States. Citizens had to internalize the national security imagination and to embody its demands. They would, in other words, have to become civilian strategists and manpower.

The importance of everyday Americans to national security arose in part from a fear of how totalitarian states mobilized their populations.<sup>93</sup> Totalitarian states, Earle warned in 1937, “frankly recognize that all national life from the birth-rate to the most delicate mechanism of the national economy shall be conducted with reference to its military utility. Conscription has taken hold of everything and everybody.”<sup>94</sup> More than a vestige of old autocratic power, totalitarianism reflected a qualitative shift in the management of populations that now endangered the rest of the international community. Earle and his colleagues urged the United States to catch up. The apparent hypocrisy of imitating totalitarianism in order to defeat it was quietly explained away elsewhere by Lauterbach, who suggested that democratic governments adopt “the technical set-up of governmental agencies and measures” of totalitarian states, while maintaining “the fundamental spirit and philosophy” inherent to democracy.<sup>95</sup>

The Princeton Group adopted totalitarian-tinged categories of citizens—soldiers, mothers, and workers—and their derivatives—such as economic potential and war potential—and bound them into a theory of “man power.” By man power, the Princeton Group meant the total human resources of a country, not, Earle wrote, “just the number of men between 18 and 45 at present available for active duty.”<sup>96</sup> Lifting the term from one of the founders of geopolitics, Sir Halford Mackinder, Earle called for “a long range national program concerning man power, designed to raise the physical and mental capacities of all citizens to the highest practicable level and to provide in peacetime physical and vocational training which will assume the maximum utilization of human resources

93. For an account of demography and statecraft in an earlier period, see Joshua Cole, *The Power of Large Numbers: Population, Politics, and Gender in Nineteenth-Century France* (Ithaca, NY, 2000).

94. Earle, Open Meeting on International Relations, speech, September 15, 1937, Folder SSRC, box 28, Earle Papers, MLP.

95. Albert Lauterbach, “Militarism in the Western World: A Comparative Study,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 5, no. 4 (1944): 478.

96. Earle's opening remarks at “Military Man Power and American Policy Conference,” proceedings, September 25, 1942, 3, Military Man Power Folder, box 30, Earle Papers, MLP.

in time of emergency.”<sup>97</sup> Nazi Germany had long understood the virtues of man power; democratic states needed to recover lost ground.

In autumn 1942, some of the Princeton Group members hosted a conference on “Man Power, Military Potential, and American Policy,” in which scholars and policymakers explored the inter-relations of demography and national strength. With a wide range of participants—the U.S. Army, Navy, Department of State, Office of Strategic Services, the Princeton University’s Office of Population Research, and several universities—the Princeton Group treated the conference as a strategic opportunity to display the benefits of a growing military-academic partnership.<sup>98</sup> The Princeton Group strove to showcase the practical utility of scholars to the conference’s co-host and sponsor, the Geopolitical Section of the Military Intelligence Division, the Army’s short-lived international relations research group.<sup>99</sup> Conference participants discussed and debated the role of all human resources in the present war and in the future. Presentations varied in geographical focus but centered on common demographic questions of fertility, mortality, and immigration, and on policies that would modify national strength.<sup>100</sup> Conference participants imbued domestic phenomena with geopolitical meaning; one country’s fertility rate spelled doom for another’s security.

The study and administration of citizens, however, was not a nostrum for winning the war or attaining the nation’s long-term security. Ordinary Americans themselves had to internalize the national security imagination, which would transform their assumptions about the world—by blurring distinctions between domestic and foreign, civilian and soldier, and peace and war—and inspire grassroots action. Elaborating on a voluntarist philosophy of the citizen in a letter to the *Princeton Herald*, Earle wrote that the war made it “imperative that every citizen consider himself a committee of one on the state of the nation and that every community undertake essential tasks without waiting for instructions from Washington.”<sup>101</sup> War demanded that all citizens

97. Earle, “Memorandum Concerning a Study of American Military Policy,” December 20, 1938, Institute for Advanced Study Grants-in-Aid File (1937–42) File, box 178, CCNY Records, CRBML; Copy of Halford Mackinder’s 1905 lecture, “Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength,” in which he coins the term “man-power,” found in Books—Democratic Ideals & Reality Folder, box 36, Earle Papers, MLP.

98. Personnel of Conference, Military Man Power Folder, box 30, Earle Papers, MLP; Earle to William T. R. Fox, September 16, 1942, Military Man Power Folder, box 30, Earle Papers, MLP.

99. Earle to Mrs. Samuels of the Princeton Herald, September 29, 1942, Military Man Power Folder, box 30, Earle Papers, MLP. The Geopolitical Section funded and organized joint academic-military roundtables on strategic issues, “mobilizing . . . the intellectual resources on a given subject.” See William S. Culbertson to Quincy Wright, September 30, 1942, Military Man Power Folder, box 30, Earle Papers, MLP.

100. “Military Man Power and American Policy Conference,” proceedings, September 25, 1942, 3–4, Military Man Power Folder, box 30, Earle Papers, MLP.

101. Earle to Princeton Herald, January 6, 1942, Citizen Involvement in War Effort Folder, box 29, Earle Papers, MLP. See also Earle to Franklin Roosevelt, January 7, 1942, Citizen Involvement in War Effort Folder, box 29, Earle Papers, MLP.

orient their individual actions towards victory. Earle envisioned such an ethos persisting into the postwar period, even if it necessitated legal enforcement.<sup>102</sup>

It was the task of state officials and the intelligentsia to push citizens in this direction. To this end, Earle wrote for the *Ladies' Home Journal*, the most popular homemaker magazine of the era, which happened to be managed by his neighbors, Bruce and Beatrice Gould.<sup>103</sup> In September 1940, Earle began a series of articles on the subject of war for the magazine, in which he adapted the Princeton Group's national security ideas for the magazine's homemaker audience. In a 1943 article, Earle familiarized readers of the *Ladies' Home Journal* with the technological innovation of aerial bombing, a novelty that radically changed combat strategy in World War II and something Earle knew about as a special consultant to the Army Air Force.<sup>104</sup> Americans had largely opposed aerial bombing before the United States' entry into the conflict, but that opposition quickly evaporated.<sup>105</sup> Articles like Earle's helped finalize that shift. Just as the Princeton Group's understanding of man power placed ordinary citizens' economic production and morale at the center of modern warfare, it also stripped enemy-state citizens of their civilian status and reframed them as members of the enemy's man power.<sup>106</sup> This view stood opposed to some remaining Americans' squeamishness at bombing industrial and transport hubs. Earle's article, accompanied by several cartoon illustrations of aerial bombing, attempted to overcome this sentiment. One colonel praised Earle's strategy of publishing in the *Ladies' Home Journal* and suggested that it may "contribute in the very greatest degree to strength and common sense on the 'Home Front,'" while another expressed interest in the Army "collaborat[ing]" with the magazine to organize a press release for the publication.<sup>107</sup>

Earle's writings in the pages of the *Ladies' Home Journal* tapped into the psychological dimensions of national security, seeking to inspire both fear and confidence in his homemaker audience. Before the American entry into the war, Earle mulled over what the Nazification of Europe and the world would mean for the United States.<sup>108</sup> The intended effect was akin to what Senator Arthur

102. Earle to various Senators, March 29, 1945, Correspondence M, box 20, Earle Papers, MLP.

103. The *Ladies' Home Journal* boasted a readership of over one million as early as 1904. See Jennifer Scanlon, *Inarticulate Longings: The Ladies' Home Journal, Gender, and the Promises of Consumer Culture* (New York, 1995), 235.

104. Earle, "Bombing Germany to Defeat," *Ladies' Home Journal* 60, no. 7 (1943): 20–21, 116–17.

105. George Hopkins, "Bombing and the American Conscience during World War II," *Historian* 28, no. 3 (1966): 451–73; Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven, CT, 1987), chap. 5.

106. Earle et al., "A Suggestion for the Army Air Forces in Europe: Locomotives as a Target," Army Air Forces Headquarters, box 25, Earle Papers, MLP.

107. Colonel M.W. Moss to Earle, June 28, 1943, Correspondence M.W. Moss Folder, box 20, Earle Papers, MLP; Earle to Colonel Edgar Sorensen, May 6, 1943, Correspondence Edgar Sorensen 1942–1943, box 23, Earle Papers, MLP.

108. Earle, "What would a Nazi victory mean to America?" *Ladies' Home Journal* 58, no. 4 (1941): 16–17, 152–53.

Vandenberg would later mean when he allegedly told Truman in 1947 to “scare [the] hell out of the American people,” that is, to scare them into accepting far-reaching measures to secure the United States.<sup>109</sup> But too much fear was also dangerous. In his other articles for the magazine, Earle propped up a belief in the United States’ global capabilities. This can be seen in his 1943 review of Lippmann’s *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, itself a bombshell of a book that helped popularize “national security” and is often, though incorrectly, cited as containing the concept’s first definition.<sup>110</sup> U.S. security, Earle wrote, was a titanic task that depended on a myriad of factors, such as great-power alliances, “the intelligent use of force,” and the support of “enlightened and determined men and women.” But it could be achieved.<sup>111</sup> Earle delicately walked the thin line between stoking fear and confidence—a paradox at the heart of national security.

The Princeton Group also used government publications to fulfill their aim of cultivating a national security imagination. In November 1942 the Office of War Information commissioned Harold Sprout to create an atlas to help ordinary citizens fit the “blow-by-blow-account of this world war,” transmitted to them by radio and newspapers, “into the grand design of the entire struggle.”<sup>112</sup> Collaborating with Margaret Sprout, Jean Gottmann, Felix Gilbert, and Earle, along with the Office of Strategic Services, the War Department, and the National Geographic Society, Sprout immediately began this “important public service.”<sup>113</sup> They published *A War Atlas for Americans* in 1944. Many contemporaries thought maps could challenge isolationist sentiment by making globality something people could experience.<sup>114</sup> After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt had encouraged Americans to purchase and “spread before [them] a map of the whole earth,” and cast such cartographic activities in the rhetoric of patriotism.<sup>115</sup> The authors of the *War Atlas* understood their work in a similar light. They sought to make citizens “map-conscious.”<sup>116</sup>

109. Quoted in David C. Unger, *The Emergency State: America’s Pursuit of Absolute Security at All Costs* (London, 2012), 71.

110. See, for example, P.G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, “National Security,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 11*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. David S. Sills (New York, 1968), 40–45. A superb assessment of Lippmann’s book is Milne, *Worldmaking*, 200–03.

111. Edward Mead Earle, “It’s Your Foreign Policy Too,” *Ladies’ Home Journal* 60, no. 8 (1943): 24.

112. The Office of War Information, *A War Atlas for Americans* (New York, 1944), iii.

113. Harold Sprout to Chester Kerr, November 19, 1942, Global War Atlas Folder, box 29, Earle Papers, MLP; Meeting Attendance, November 27, 1942, Global War Atlas Folder, box 29, Earle Papers, MLP; The Office of War Information, *A War Atlas*, ii.

114. Susan Schulten, *The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880–1950* (Chicago, IL, 2001), 110–237; Timothy Barney, *Mapping the Cold War: Cartography and the Framing of America’s International Power* (Chapel Hill, 2014), 25–60; William Rankin, *After the Map: Cartography, Navigation, and the Transformation of Territory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, IL, 2016), 65–93.

115. Franklin Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942, *APP*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16224>. Cited in Schulten, *Geographical Imagination*, 204.

116. The Office of War Information, *War Atlas*, vii.





Figure 1: “Facing Two Fronts.” From The Office of War Information, *War Atlas*, 2–3.

This map-consciousness, however, came with a caveat. The Princeton Group aimed to represent the United States visually as the center of the globe (figure 1). The United States’ geography, the authors contended, tied the European and African theaters to the Pacific theater. To provide a “more realistic view of the war” and the United States’ centrality to it, they did not orient all maps along the north-south axis and often duplicated Asia, which had the effect of emphasizing U.S. connections to the Asia-Pacific via both the west coast and via Europe (figure 2).<sup>117</sup> It was a *world* war because of the United States’ geographic location. U.S. isolationism was thus irrelevant as a description of the world and as polemic. In this regard, the *War Atlas* sought to undermine one of

117. Ibid., vii, 1.



**Figure 2:** “Axis Highwater Mark. 1942.” From The Office of War Information, *War Atlas*, 83.

the conceptual bastions of the term “national defense”—guarded by two oceans, insulated from the instability of Asia and Europe—and to prepare the U.S. mind for the global dimensions of national security.

The Princeton Group worked towards cultivating a national security imagination among the populace. If the United States was to embrace the immediate war effort, the extensive needs of national security, and a long-term commitment to U.S. power at home and abroad, citizens had to imbibe strategic thinking. When Earle lambasted athletes who were still participating in sport events at the height of war for not putting “the interests of the nation before their own interests,” he was asking citizens to situate their personal lives in the broader currents of geopolitics and to view themselves as man power, as conscious material for the state.<sup>118</sup> The Princeton Group wanted this new citizen to outlast the Second World War.

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Observing signs of a doomed international order in the late 1930s and 1940s, Earle and his colleagues proposed a novel way of imagining the United States in the world. The national security imagination that they created bore the imprint of its era. It took inspiration from totalitarian governance, turned fear into a foreign policy, and subsumed U.S. institutions and citizens under geopolitical goals. The Princeton Group aspired to inculcate the national security imagination within U.S. institutions and citizens. And it became totalizing. From academic communities to everyday Americans, all were to be judged by their contributions to national security. For the Princeton Group, these were the domestic consequences of the modern international system.

<sup>118</sup> Earle to James Byrnes, January 2, 1945, Correspondence W, box 24, Earle Papers, MLP.

By 1945, Earle became increasingly worried that the war's end would thwart their efforts to promote a national security imagination among academics, administrators, and ordinary Americans until the next emergency. Earle knew "that there will be a grave temptation shortly after the war to allow academic, public, and official concern with the national security to lapse into neglect and indifference," but he warned against the "relaxation of vigilance in academic circles." Should a lapse occur, he wrote, "the United States will be unprepared psychologically, morally, and politically to play its part in the affairs of world, or to meet any crisis which may arise from renewed threats of aggression."<sup>119</sup> U.S. globalism depended on the preparedness of the state and its people even in peacetime, because, to the Princeton Group, war and peace were just different "stages of mobilization."<sup>120</sup> Earle was eager to sustain the Princeton Group's efforts. And in order to reboot the seminar, Earle requested government funding to the tune of \$1 million.<sup>121</sup>

Earle's anxieties turned out to be misplaced however, as the Truman administration implemented the National Security Act of 1947, interrupted demobilization, and expanded U.S. military and political commitments around the world.<sup>122</sup> The administration rendered war preparedness permanent. This post-war shift was accompanied by other radical changes anticipated by the Princeton Group. In the context of a burgeoning national security state and the start of the Cold War, applied research in the service of the state attained a higher cachet, leading one famous sociologist to describe the social sciences as "a basic national resource."<sup>123</sup> Meanwhile, the wartime alliance between scientists and the state persisted long after 1945, forming a critical link in the post-war "military-industrial complex." National security concerns underwrote this alliance: in 1953, 90% of federal funding for research and development flowed to security-related projects.<sup>124</sup> Finally, the national security imagination

119. Earle to James Forrestal, June 1, 1945, Correspondence D, box 14, Earle Papers, MLP.

120. Earle, "Military Policy and Statecraft: A Proposed Field for Study in International Relations," n.d. [November 1937], Earle Faculty File (1936-37), box 6, Records of the Director of the Office, IASA.

121. Over \$13 million today. Forrestal declined Earle's request, but the Carnegie Corporation stepped up and funded the seminar from 1946 to 1954, though not in the amount Earle had requested. Earle to James Forrestal, June 1, 1945, Correspondence D, box 14, Earle Papers, MLP; Robert L. Lester to Frank Aydelotte, June 12, 1946, Earle Faculty File (1945-47), box 6, Records of the Office of the Director, IASA.

122. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 23-68; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 141-219; Stuart, *Creating the National Security State*.

123. Talcott Parsons, "Social Science: A Basic National Resource" [1948], reprinted in *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences*, eds. Samuel Z. Klausner and Victor M. Lidz (Philadelphia, PA, 1986), 41-112. See Mark Solovey, *Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America* (New Brunswick, NJ, 2013).

124. Steven Usselman, "Research and Development," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the History of American Science, Medicine, and Technology*, ed. Hugh Richard Slotten (New York, 2015), online, accessed July 9, 2018, 10.1093/acref/9780199766666.001.0001. See also Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," January 17, 1961, *APP*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12086>.

extended ever further into public life, as Americans conjured communist conspiracies and nuclear apocalypse. These fears resulted in widespread support for the extensive national security policies, citizen participation in civil defense initiatives, and a growing interest in world affairs.<sup>125</sup>

The postwar embrace of Earle's vision of national security owed much to bureaucratic entrepreneurs, fear-mongering politicians, and leaders in the armed services, all responding to the new, uncertain international order that they all faced. But members of the Princeton Group were also a vital nexus in this reconceptualization of the U.S. state, foreign policy, and strategy. Their influence can be gauged by looking at "A Security Policy for Postwar America," a memorandum authored by Harold Sprout and Earle, in collaboration with scholars from the Yale Institute of International Studies and Columbia, all of whom served in some official capacity during the war. Rejecting the doctrine of free security, the document began: "the day when the United States can take 'a free ride' in security is over." It then traced the vast strategic commitments required for the postwar world order, stretching from Latin America to Asia to Europe and to the U.S. homeland itself.<sup>126</sup> They sent the memo to more than two dozen leaders, including General George Marshall, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr., Lippmann, and Forrestal, who was deeply impressed. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee saw the memo filling a "desperate need for contribution to this type of thinking and strategical planning" and designated it an official Joint Chiefs of Staff planning document.<sup>127</sup> Not only were their ideas therefore taken up by U.S. strategists, the Princeton Group members and their colleagues also demonstrated the value of civilian expertise and thereby helped carve the institutional space for the Cold War defense intellectual.<sup>128</sup>

More significantly, however, members of the Princeton Group contributed novel language for what they perceived to be novel world-historical conditions. In the 1930s and the early 1940s, "national security" connoted a policy response to the economic crisis, but by 1945 it had become associated with geopolitics and war. Charles Beard's reflections on the need to expand the social safety net in his paper "The Quest for National Security," written only a decade earlier in 1935, could not be more distant from the planet-sprawling military

125. McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*; Sherry, *In the Shadow of War*, chap. 3.

126. Frederick S. Dunn, Edward Mead Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers, "A Security Policy for Postwar America" (March 8, 1945), folder 4948, box 417, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RAC. Also available at [https://rockfound.rockarch.org/digital-library-listing/-/asset\\_publisher/yYxpQfeI4W8N/content/a-security-policy-for-postwar-america](https://rockfound.rockarch.org/digital-library-listing/-/asset_publisher/yYxpQfeI4W8N/content/a-security-policy-for-postwar-america): 1.

127. Quoted in Ramos, "The Role of the Yale Institute of International Studies," 255–56, 308–12. See also Mark Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), 227–30; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 10–11.

128. Exemplary works that explore the contributions of social scientists during the Cold War are Bruce Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger* (Princeton, NJ, 2006); Bessner, *Democracy in Exile*; Joy Rohde, *Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of Social Research During the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 2013).



**Figure 3:** U.S. Army Air Force General Carl Spaatz awarding Earle the Presidential Medal for Merit. Earle won the award for his contributions to the aerial bombing campaign and for his efforts to educate the public during war. May 13, 1946, U.S. Army A.A.F. photo. From the IASA.

commitments laid out in “A Security Policy for Postwar America.”<sup>129</sup> Members of the Princeton Group helped spur this shift. They were among the earliest commentators to orient national security towards its militarized meaning and to circulate the concept in academe, the policy community, and public discourse. Early on in the seminar, they obtained endorsements from two key visionaries of the national security state—Walter Lippmann and James Forrestal—both of whom latched on to the Princeton Group’s language and deployed it in their advocacy for permanent preparedness and an interventionist, globalist foreign policy. Echoing Earle from half a decade earlier, Forrestal told a Senate committee in 1945 that he preferred the term “security” over “defense.” As a sign of its novelty and growing popularity, one senator replied, “I like your words, ‘national security,’” and claimed to use them himself.<sup>130</sup>

129. Charles Beard, “The Quest for National Security,” in National Education Association of the United States, *Proceedings of the Seventy-Third Annual Meeting* 73 (1935): 510–15.

130. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, *Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs*, 79th Cong., 1st

Beyond a look at its local influence, an examination of the Princeton Group illuminates the meaning—both historical and contemporary—of national security. Earle's rationale for employing national security over national defense points to crucial differences between the two concepts. Whereas national defense posited boundaries between the domestic and the foreign, soldier and civilian, and war and peace, national security neither conceptually nor in practice divides the world along such lines. Under a regime of national security, everything can be imagined as a potential target and enemies can be imagined everywhere. The Princeton Group's totalizing conception emerged from interwar fears and hardened during the violence of World War II. Sixty years later, the authors of the *9/11 Commission Report* echoed this totalizing nature of national security. In explaining how the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon occurred, the authors of the report listed the "failure of imagination" as the first of four critical faults; national security institutions did not imagine the conversion of civilian aircrafts into ballistic weapons.<sup>131</sup> Looking towards the future, they recommended that these institutions "find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination."<sup>132</sup> Much like the Princeton Group, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the nation's security depended on a militarized, permanently suspicious imagination. The Princeton Group's national security imagination, however, represented a rupture in U.S. thought during the 1930s and 1940s, whereas the war on terror has made it ordinary.

Session, 99, 108, 117. Quoted in Emily S. Rosenberg, "Commentary: The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 2 (1993): 278.

131. The other three were policy, capabilities, and management. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, DC, 2004), 339–60.

132. *Ibid.*, 344–48.

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